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CITIZENS WORLDWIDE HAVE demonstrated serious 
concerns regarding the management of personal 
information by online services. For instance, the 
2015 Eurobarometer about data protection13 reveals 
that: 63% of citizens within the Eurpean Union (EU) 
do not trust online businesses, more than half do not 
like providing personal information in return for free 
services, and 53% do not like that Internet companies 
use their personal information in tailored advertising. 
Similarly, a recent survey carried out among U.S. users9 
reveals that 53% of respondents were 
against receiving tailored ads from the 
information websites and apps learn 
about them, 42% do not think websites 
care about using users data securely 
and responsibly at all, and 73% con-
siders websites know too much about 
users. A survey conducted by Internet 
Society (ISOC) in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion in 20168 disclosed that 59% of the 
respondent did not feel their privacy 
is sufficiently protected when using 
the Internet, and 45% considered get-
ting the attention of policymakers in 
their country on data protection a 
matter or urgency.
Policymakers have reacted to this 
situation by passing or proposing new 
regulations in the area of privacy and/or 
data protection. For instance, in May 
2018, the EU enforced the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)6 
across all 28 member states. Similarly, 
in June 2018, California passed the Cal-
ifornia Consumer Privacy Act,3 which is 
claimed to be the nation’s toughest data 
privacy law. In countries like Argentina 
or Chile, the governments proposed 
new bills in 2017 updating their existing 
data protection regulation.11 For this 
article, we will take as reference the 
GDPR since it is the one affecting more 
countries, citizens, and companies.
The GDPR (but also most data pro-
tection regulations) define some cate-
gories of personal data as sensitive 
and prohibits processing them with 
limited exceptions (for example, the 
user provides explicit consent to pro-








Facebook labels 67% of its users with 
potential sensitive interests, 
sometimes at great risk to the user.
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 key insights
 ˽ 67% of FB users, which corresponds to 
22% worldwide citizens, are labeled with 
some potentially sensitive ad preferences.
 ˽ The EU’s GDPR had a negligible impact on 
FB regarding the use of sensitive ad 
preferences for commercial purposes
 ˽ In October 2018, FB labeled 540k users  
in Saudi Arabia with the ad preference 
“Homosexuality.” As of Nov. 11, 2020,  
this number was still 250k users.  
We observe the same issue in other countries 
where, like Saudi Arabia, homosexuality  
is punished with the death penalty.
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Figure 1 (left side). The text in the ad 
clearly reflects the ad was targeting 
homosexual people. The author had 
not explicitly defined his sexual orien-
tation, but he discovered that FB had 
assigned him the “Homosexuality” ad 
preference (see Figure 1 right side).
First, this article extends the scope 
of our analysis from the EU to 197 
countries worldwide in February 
2019. We quantify the portion of FB 
users that have been assigned ad pref-
erences linked to potentially sensi-
tive personal data across the referred 
197 countries.
Second, we analyze whether the en-
actment of the GDPR on May 28, 2018 
had some impact on the FB practices 
regarding the use of sensitive ad pref-
erences. To this end, we compare the 
number of EU users labeled with po-
tentially sensitive ad preferences in 
January 2018, October 2018 and Febru-
ary 2019 (five months before, five 
months after and nine months after 
the GDPR was enacted, respectively).
Third, we discuss privacy and eth-
ics risks that may be derived from the 
exploitation of sensitive FB ad prefer-
ences. As an illustrative example, we 
quantify the portion of FB users la-
beled with the ad preference Homo-
sexuality in countries where homo-
sexuality is punished even with the 
death penalty.
Finally, we present a technical solu-
tion that allows users to remove in a 
simple way the sensitive interests FB 
has assigned them.
Background
Advertisers configure their ad cam-
paigns through the FB Ads Manager.a It 
allows advertisers to define the audi-
ence (that is, user profile) they want to 
target with their advertising cam-
paigns. It can be accessed through ei-
ther a dashboard or an API. The FB Ads 
Manager offers advertisers a wide range 
of configuration parameters such as 
(but not limited to): location (country, 
region, and so on), demographic pa-
rameters (gender, age, among others), 
behaviors (mobile device, OS and/or 
Web browser used, and so on), and in-
terests (sports, food). The interest pa-
rameter is the most relevant for our 
work. It includes hundreds of thou-
sands of possibilities capturing users’ 
interest of any type. The FB Ads Manag-
er provides detailed information about 
the configured audience. The most rel-
evant element for this article is the Po-
tential Reach that reports the number of 
monthly active users in FB matching 
the defined audience.
In parallel, FB assigns to each user a 
set of ad preferences, that is, a set of in-
terests, derived from the data and ac-
tivity of the user on FB. These ad prefer-
ences are indeed the interests offered 
to advertisers in the FB Ads Manager.b 
Therefore, if a user is assigned “Watches” 
within her list of ad preferences, she 
will be a potential target of any FB ad-
vertising campaign configured to reach 
users interested in watches. It is impor-
tant to note that ad preferences in the 
FB ad ecosystem are available world-
wide, thus there are not specific ad 
preferences per country.
The dataset used in this work is ob-
tained from the data collected with our 
FDVT Web browser extension.1 The 
Data Valuation Tool for Facebook Users 
(FDVT) is a Web browser extension cur-
rently available for Google Chromec and 
Mozilla Firefox.d The FDVT main func-
tionality is to provide users with a real-
time estimation of the revenue they gen-
erate for FB out of the ads they receive 
in FB. To compute that estimation we 
obtain from the FB API the price adver-
tisers are willing to pay to display ads 
a https://www.facebook.com/ads/manager
b Given that interests and ad preferences 
refer to the same thing, we use these two 
terms interchangeably in the rest of the article.
c https://bit.ly/3iMoytw
d https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/fdvt
purpose). In particular, the GDPR de-
fines as sensitive personal data as: 
“data revealing racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philo-
sophical beliefs, or trade union mem-
bership, and the processing of genetic 
data, biometric data for the purpose of 
uniquely identifying a natural person, 
data concerning health or data con-
cerning a natural person’s sex life or 
sexual orientation.”
In a recent work,2 we demonstrated 
that Facebook (FB) labels 73% of users 
within the EU with potentially sensi-
tive interests (referred to as ad prefer-
ences as well), which may contravene 
the GDPR. FB assigns user’s different 
ad preferences based on their online 
activity within this social network. Ad-
vertisers running ad campaigns can 
target groups of users that have been 
assigned a particular ad preference (for 
example, target FB users interested in 
Starbucks). Some of these ad prefer-
ences may suggest political opinions 
(for example, Socialist party), sexual 
orientation (for example, homosexual-
ity), personal health issues (for exam-
ple, breast cancer awareness), and oth-
er potentially sensitive attributes. In 
the vast majority of the cases, the re-
ferred sensitive ad preferences are in-
ferred from the user behavior in FB 
without obtaining explicit consent 
from the user. Then advertisers may 
reach FB users based on ad preferenc-
es tightly linked to sensitive informa-
tion. For instance, one of the authors 
of this article received the ad shown in 
Figure 1. Snapshot of an ad received by one of the authors of this article and ad preference 
list showing that FB inferred this person was interested in homosexuality.
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ic, U.S., among others). FFB(C,N) is 
computed as the ratio between the num-
ber of FB users that have been assigned 
at least one of the top N potentially 
sensitive ad preferences and the total 
number of FB users in country C. Final-
ly, it is important to note that the FB 
Ads Manager API only allows creating 
audiences with at most N = 1,000 inter-
ests. Therefore, in practice, the maxi-
mum value of N we can use to compute 
FFB is 1,000.
Exposure of FB Users to Potentially 
Sensitive Ad Preferences
We have computed the portion of FB us-
ers that have been assigned some of the 
2,067 potentially sensitive ad preferenc-
es within 197 different countries. Figure 
2 shows a choropleth map of FFB(C,1000) 
for those countries in February 2019.
If we consider the 197 altogether, 
67% of FB users are tagged with some 
potentially sensitive ad preference. 
This portion of users corresponds to 
22% of citizens across the 197 analyzed 
countries according to the population 
data reported by the World Bank.g 
However, FFB shows an important vari-
ation across countries.
We find the most impacted country 
is Malta where 82% of FB users are as-
signed some potentially sensitive ad 
preference. Contrary, the least impact-
ed country is Equatorial Guinea where 
37% of FB users are assigned potentially 
sensitive ad preferences.
More interesting, an overview of the 
map seems to suggest that western 
countries have a higher exposure to 
g https://data.worldbank.org
and gather clicks from users with the 
same profile as the FDVT user and quan-
tify the number of ads the FDVT user 
receives and clicks during a Facebook 
session. The FDVT collects (among oth-
er data) the ad preferences FB assigns to 
the user by parsing the user’s ad prefer-
ences’ pagee where any user can find her 
ad preferences’ list. It is important to 
note that all FDVT users granted us ex-
plicit permission to use the collected 
information (in an anonymous man-
ner) for research purposes. We leverage 
this information to identify potentially 
sensitive ad preferences assigned to us-
ers that have installed the FDVT.
Finally, for any ad preference, we 
can query the FB Ads Manager API to 
retrieve the Potential Reach (that is, 
FB active users) associated with any 
FB audience. Hence, we can obtain 
the number of FB users in any country 
(or group of countries) that have been 
assigned a particular interest (or 
group of interests).
Data and Methodology
We seek to quantify the number of FB 
users that have been assigned poten-
tially sensitive ad preferences across 
197 countries in February 2019. To this 
end, we follow a two-step process.
First, we identify likely sensitive 
ad preferences within five of the rel-
evant categories listed as Sensitive 
Personal Data by the GDPR: racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, reli-
gious or philosophical beliefs, 
health, and sexual orientation. This 
article reuses the list of 2092 poten-
tially sensitive ad preferences we ob-
tained in Cabañas et al.2 out of ana-
lyzing more than 126k unique ad 
preferences assigned 5.5M times to 
more than 4.5k FDVT users.
To extract that list we first imple-
mented an automatic process to re-
duce the list of 126k ad preferences to 
4,452 likely sensitive ad preferences. 
Next, we recruited a group of 12 panel-
ists who manually classified the 4,452 
ad preferences into sensitive, in case 
they could be assigned to some of the 
five sensitive categories referred 
above, or non-sensitive. All of the pan-
elists are researchers (faculty or Ph.D. 
students) with some knowledge in the 
e https://www.facebook.com/ads/preferences/
edit
area of privacy. Each ad preference re-
ceived five votes, and we used majority 
voting10 to classify each ad preference 
either as sensitive or non-sensitive. 
Overall, 2092f out of the 4,452 ad pref-
erences were labeled as sensitive. We 
referred to this subset of 2,092 ad pref-
erences as the suspected sensitive sub-
set. We collected this set in January 
2018 and checked that 2,067 out of 
these 2,092 potentially sensitive ad 
preferences were still available within 
the FB Ads Manager in February 2019.
Second, we leveraged the FB Ads 
Manager API to retrieve the portion of 
FB users in each country that had been 
assigned at least one of the Top N 
(with N ranging between 1 and 2,067) 
potentially sensitive ad preferences 
from the suspected sensitive subset. 
In particular, we retrieve how many 
users in a given country are interested 
in ad preference 1 OR ad preference 2 
OR ad preference 3... OR ad prefer-
ence N. An example of this for N = 3 
could be “How many people in France 
are interested in Pregnancy OR Homo-
sexuality OR Veganism.” We have de-
fined the following metric that we use 
in the rest of the article.
–FFB(C,N). Percentage of FB users in 
country C that have been assigned at 
least one of the top N potentially sensi-
tive ad preferences from the suspected 
sensitive subset. We note C may also re-
fer to all the countries forming a partic-
ular region (for example, EU, Asia-Pacif-
f https://fdvt.org/usenix2018/panelists.html. 
This resource includes the list of all potential-
ly sensitive ad preferences manually labeled 
by the panelists along with the 5 votes each of 
them received from the panelists.
Figure 2. Choropleth map of the number of FB users assigned potentially sensitive ad 
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affected by flu. Therefore, the level of 
sensitivity of our list of interests is very 
likely subjective and will depend on 
each person personal perception.
Here, we zoom in our analysis to a 
narrowed list of interests that match 
undoubtedly with the definition of the 
GDPR for the case of sensitive personal 
data. We examined a subset of 15 ad 
preferences not compliant with the 
GDPR definition of sensitive personal 
data. We supported our statement ask-
ing for validation by an expert from the 
Spanish Data Protection Authority 
(DPA). This expert, with both a very 
deep knowledge of the GDPR and a 
technical background that allow him 
perfectly understanding the FB adver-
tisement ecosystem, verified that in his 
opinion these 15 ad preferences do not 
comply with the GDPR.
We retrieve the portion of FB users 
assigned in each of the 197 countries 
analyzed that have been assigned each 
of the 15 expert verified ad preferences 
and the aggregation of them. Since it is 
unfeasible to show the results for each 
of the countries within the paper, we 
have grouped them into five conti-
nents: Africa, America, Asia, Europe, 
and Oceania. To obtain the desegregat-
ed results for each country we refer the 
reader to the following external link.h
Table 2 shows FFB for each of the ex-
pert-verified sensitive ad preferences 
within the five continents. Besides, the 
last row referred to as Union shows the 
aggregated results considering all the 
15 interests within a group, while the 
last column World depicts the overall re-
sults considering all 197 countries. The 
results show that when considering all 
the 197 countries 33% of FB users, which 
corresponds to almost 11% of citizens 
within those countries, have been la-
beled with some of the 15 sensitive in-
terests in the table. As it was expected 
from the correlation results depicted in 
the previous section, Asia and Africa are 
showing the lowest values of FFB 
(27.62% and 30.43%, respectively). The 
exposition of FB users grows up to 38.25.
If we look in detail some of the ad 
preferences in the table, we observe 
h https://fdvt.org/world_sensitivities_2019/display_
sensitivities.html. This resource is a website in 
which the reader can select any country in the 
world and obtain the percentage of users in that 
country that have been assigned each of the 15 
very sensitive ad preferences listed in Table 2.
developed countries are more exposed 
to be labeled with sensitive ad prefer-
ences than users in Africa and Asia. It is 
interesting to observe that in the case of 
South-America we observe a similar pat-
tern in which the most powerful econo-
mies and developed countries such as 
Brazil, Chile, and Argentina show high-
er exposure to sensitive ad preferences 
than other countries in South-America.
Exposure of FB Users to Very 
Sensitive Ad Preferences
Although legislation tries to define 
what sensitive data is, some people 
might think that not all different sensi-
tive data items are equally sensitive. 
For instance, data revealing sexual ori-
entation from somebody could be con-
sidered more sensitive than, for example, 
data showing that one user may be 
potentially sensitive ad preferences 
compared to Asian and African coun-
tries. To quantify these effects we have 
computed the Pearson correlation of 
the FFB metric with the following so-
cio-economic indicators: FB penetra-
tion; expected years of school; access to 
a mobile phone or Internet at home; 
GDP per capita; voice and accountabili-
ty; and birth rate. Note that Western de-
veloped countries show higher values in 
all the indicators but birth rate. Hence, 
we hypothesize that we will find a posi-
tive correlation between FFB and all the 
indicators but birth rate. Table 1 shows 
the results of the referred correlations.
The results corroborate our hypoth-
esis since all the indicators but birth 
rate are positively correlated with FFB. 
In summary, the results validate our ini-
tial observation that FB users in western 
Table 2. Percentage of FB users (FFB) within Africa, America, Asia, Europe, and Oceania 
assigned some sensitive ad preferences from a list of 15 expert-verified sensitive ad prefer-
ences as non-GDPR compliant. Last column “World” shows FFB for the aggregation of all 
197 considered countries. Last row shows the result for the 15 ad preferences aggregated.
Ad preference Africa America Asia Europe Oceania World
Alternative medicine 3.40 11.35 3.27 7.17 10.82 6.26
Bible 13.28 14.65 6.31 8.13 14.61 9.68
Buddhism 2.87 5.38 10.36 4.13 7.19 7.23
Feminism 3.22 9.27 2.08 6.52 10.84 5.01
Gender identity 0.08 0.46 0.07 0.20 0.60 0.21
Homosexuality 2.66 7.93 2.27 6.07 8.48 4.57
Illegal immigration 0.26 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.08
Judaism 11.06 3.72 1.91 .24 2.44 3.33
Lgbt community 3.93 13.89 5.39 11.94 14.82 8.79
Nationalism 1.82 1.11 1.28  1.32 0.95 1.28
Oncology 1.30 1.33 0.38 0.84 0.97 0.81
Pregnancy 11.75 19.17 11.58 17.09 21.41 14.71
Reproductive health 0.36 0.24 0.17 0.07 0.09 0.19
Suicide prevention 0.05 0.30 0.03 0.08 1.02 0.13
Veganism 5.97 14.18 6.83 16.98  22.78 10.61
Union 30.43 40.66 27.62 38.25 46.92 33.45
Table 1. Pearson correlation and p_value between FFB and six socioeconomic development 
indicators of the country.
Indicator correlation FFB p_value
FB penetration 0.544 2.2e-16
Expected Years of School 0.444 7.249e-09
Access to a mobile phone or Internet at home (% age 15+) 0.395 1.478e-06
GDP per capita (current USD) 0.381 5.733e-08
Voice and Accountability 0.372 1.142e-07
Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people) –0.455 4.922e-11
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tagged with some sensitive ad prefer-
ence through a phishing-like attack7 at a 
cheap cost ranging between €0.015 and 
€1.5 per user, depending on the success 
ratio of the attack. Following, we de-
scribe other potential risks associated 
with sensitive ad preferences.
Recently, a journalist of the Washing-
ton Post wrote an article to denounce her 
own experience after she became preg-
nant.i It seems FB algorithms inferred 
that situation out of some actions she 
performed while browsing in FB. Prob-
ably FB labeled her with the ad prefer-
ence “pregnancy” or some other similar 
and she started to receive pregnancy-
related ads. Unfortunately, the journal-
ist had a stillbirth but she kept receiving 
ads related to pregnancy, which exposed 
here to a very uncomfortable experience.
Another serious risk, which in our 
opinion is extremely worrying, is linked 
to the fact that many FB users are tagged 
with the interest “Homosexuality” in 
countries where being homosexual is il-
legal and may even be punished with 
the death penalty. There are still 78 
countries in the world where homosexu-




that the portion of users worldwide la-
beled with the ad preference homosex-
uality is almost 5%. This number dou-
bles for the ad preference bible 
(intimate related to one particular reli-
gious belief), and grows up to almost 
15% for pregnancy.
Comparison of EU FB Users 
Exposure to Potentially Sensitive 
Ad Preferences Before and 
After GDPR Enforcement
This section aims to analyze whether 
the GDPR enforcement had some ef-
fect on minimizing the use of poten-
tially sensitive ad preferences in the 
EU. To that end we compare the expo-
sure of EU users to potentially sensi-
tive ad preferences in January 20182 
(five months before the GDPR was en-
forced) to the exposure measured in 
October 2018 and February 2019 (five 
and nine months after the GDPR was 
enforced, respectively).
The first relevant change is that FB 
had removed 19 ad preferences in Oc-
tober 2018 and 25 in February 2019 
from the set of 2,092 potentially sensi-
tive ad preferences we retrieved on Jan-
uary 2018. Although this is a negligible 
amount, it is worth noting that five of 
the removed ad preferences are: Com-
munism, Islam, Quran, Socialism, and 
Christianity. These five ad preferences 
were included in an initial set of 20 ad 
preferences verified by the DPA expert 
as very sensitive. Although we observe 
the removal of these five elements hap-
pened around the GDPR enforcement 
(between January 2018 and October 
2018) we do not know whether the ac-
tual reason why FB deleted those ad 
preferences was a reaction to the GDPR 
or there was a different motivation.
Figure 3 shows the FFB difference in 
percentage points between the results 
obtained in January 2018 and October 
2018 (grey bar); and between January 
2018 and February 2019 (black bar) 
across the 28 EU countries, and the EU 
aggregated labeled as EU28.
If we consider the results of October 
2018, we observe that the portion of us-
ers labeled with potentially sensitive ad 
preferences was lower in all EU coun-
tries but Spain after the GDPR enforce-
ment (that is, compared to the data ob-
tained in January 2018). However, the 
aggregated EU reduction is rather 
small, only three percentage points. 
The largest reduction is 7.33 percent-
age points in the case of Finland.
The slight reduction observed in 
the results obtained in October 2018 
seems to disappear when we observe 
the results from February 2019. There 
are 13 countries where the portion of 
users labeled with potentially sensi-
tive data is higher in February 2019 as 
compared to January 2018. Overall, the 
aggregated results show that the por-
tion of users labeled with potentially 
sensitive ad preferences in February 
2019 is only 1% less than in January 2018.
In summary, the overall impact of 
the GPDR to prevent FB of using poten-
tially sensitive ad preferences for ad-
vertising purposes is negligible.
Ethics and Privacy Risks 
Associated with Sensitive 
Personal Data Exploitation
The possibility of reaching users labeled 
with potentially sensitive personal data 
enables the use of FB ad campaigns to 
attack (for example, hate speech) spe-
cific groups of people based on sensitive 
personal data (ethnicity, sexual orienta-
tion, religious beliefs, and so on). Even 
worse, in Cabañas,2 we performed a 
ball-park estimation showing that in av-
erage an attacker could retrieve person-
al identifiable information (PII) of users 
Figure 3. Variation of FFB in percentage points for each EU country between: the data 
obtained in January 2018 and October 2018 (five months before and five months after 
the GDPR was enacted) represented by the grey bar; the data obtained in January 2018 
and February 2019 (five months before and nine months after the GDPR was enacted) 
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take immediate actions to avoid worry-
ing and painful situations like the ones 
exposed in this section, in which FB may 
unintentionally expose users to serious 
risks. The most efficient and privacy-pre-
serving solution would be implementing 
an opt-in process in which users have to 
proactively accept receiving targeted ads. 
That solution would empower the users 
to avoid companies like FB to process 
personal data (including sensitive one) 
for advertising purposes, and, therefore, 
would alleviate the potential privacy risks 
associated to the use of sensitive ad pref-
erences for users that do not opt-in. How-
ever, that is unlikely to happen in the 
short-term. Meanwhile, a straightfor-
ward action should be stopping using the 
ad preference “Homosexuality” (or simi-
lar ones) in countries where being homo-
sexual is illegal, and other very sensitive 
ad preferences like the 15 ones we list in 
this article.
FDVT Extension to Allow 
Users Removing Potentially 
Sensitive Ad Preferences
The results reported previously moti-
vate the development of solutions that 
make users aware of the use of sensitive 
personal data for advertising purposes. 
In addition, it is also important to em-
power them to remove in a very simple 
manner those sensitive ad preferences 
they do not fill comfortable with. Unfor-
tunately, the existing process FB offers 
is unknown and complex for most us-
ers. To this end, we have extended the 
FDVT browser extension to inform us-
ers about the potentially sensitive ad 
preferences that FB has assigned them, 
both the active ones but also those as-
signed in the past that are not currently 
active; or allow users to remove with a 
single click either all the active sensi-
tive ad preferences or those individual 
ones users do not fill comfortable with.
We have introduced a new button in 
the FDVT extension interface with the la-
bel “Sensitive FB Preferences.” When a 
user clicks on that button, we display a 
page listing at the top the potentially sensi-
tive ad preferences included in the user’s 
ad preference set (both the active ones and 
inactive ones). Figure 4 shows an example 
of this page. We provide the following in-
formation for each ad preference: Ad pref-
erence name; Topic; and, Sensitive, wheth-
er the ad preference is potentially sensitive 
(highlighted in yellow) or not. Besides, next 
to each ad preference there is a button De-
lete Ad Preference to individually remove 
those ad preferences. Moreover, we pro-
vide another button More Info to individ-
ually display the historical information 
for the ad preference, which includes the 
period(s) when the ad preference has 
been active and the reason why FB has 
assigned that ad preference to the user. 
Finally, at the top of the page we include 
a search bar to look for specific prefer-
ences and two buttons: Delete All Sensi-
tive Ad Preferences and Delete All Ad Prefer-
ences to remove all currently active 
where the maximum punishment is the 
death penalty. Table 3 shows the FFB 
metric results only considering the in-
terest “Homosexuality” in countries that 
penalize homosexuality with the death 
penalty. For instance, in the case of Sau-
di Arabia, we found that FB assigns the 
ad preference “Homosexuality” to 540K 
users (2.08% of all FB users in that coun-
try). In the case of Nigeria 620k (2.35% of 
all FB users in that country).
We acknowledge the debate regarding 
what is sensitive and what is not is a com-
plex one. However, we believe FB should 
Table 3. Percentage of FB users (FFB) tagged with the interest “Homosexuality” in 
countries where being homosexual may lead to death penalty. Note we do not include 







AE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 3.00
BN BRUNEI  5.24
NG NIGERIA 2.35
SA SAUDI ARABIA 2.08
YE YEMEN 1.08
IQ IRAQ 3.20
Figure 4. Snapshot of FDVT new feature to allow users deleting sensitive ad preferences.
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potentially sensitive ad preferences and 
all currently active, respectively.
Related Work
We published a prior article2 in which 
we already analyzed the use of sensitive 
information on FB. That article focuses 
on the European Union a few months 
before the GDPR was enacted. The re-
search community asked us in various 
forums that it would be interesting to 
further extend our analysis to cover the 
use of sensitive information on FB 
worldwide and not just in the EU, and to 
understand the potential impact that 
the GDPR could have on reducing the 
exposure of users to sensitive ad prefer-
ences. This article covers both requests 
and, in addition, it adds two more con-
tributions: We present two clear scenari-
os in which the use of sensitive ad prefer-
ences could have serious consequences 
for the users; and we introduce an im-
provement of the FDVT that allows users 
to remove in a simple way potentially 
sensitive ad preferences they do not like.
Few previous works in the literature 
address issues associated with sensitive 
personal data in online advertising, as 
well as some recent works that analyze 
privacy and discrimination issues relat-
ed to FB advertising and ad preferences.
Carrascosa et al.4 propose a new 
methodology to quantify the portion of 
targeted ads received by Internet users 
while they browse the web. They create 
bots, referred to as personas, with very 
specific interest profiles (for example, 
persona interested in cars) and measure 
how many of the received ads match the 
specific interest of the analyzed perso-
na. They create personas based on sen-
sitive personal data (health) and dem-
onstrate that they are also targeted with 
ads related to the sensitive information 
used to create the persona’s profile.
Castellucia et al.5 show that an attack-
er that gets access (for example, through 
a public WiFi network) to the Google ads 
received by a user could create an inter-
est’ profile that could reveal up to 58% of 
the actual interests of the user. The au-
thors state that if some of the unveiled 
interests are sensitive, it could imply se-
rious privacy risks for users.
Venkatadri et al.14 and Speicher et 
al.12 exposed privacy and discrimination 
vulnerabilities related to FB advertising. 
In Venkatadri,14 the authors demon-
strate how an attacker can use FB third-
party tracking JavaScript to retrieve per-
sonal data (for example, mobile phone 
numbers) associated with users visiting 
the attacker’s website. Moreover, in 
Speicher,13 authors demonstrate that 
sensitive FB ad preferences can be used 
to apply negative discrimination in ad-
vertising campaigns (for example, ex-
cluding people based on their race). 
This work also shows that some ad pref-
erences that initially may not seem sen-
sitive could be used to discriminate in 
advertising campaigns (for example, ex-
cluding people interested in Blacknews.
com that are potentially Black people).
Conclusion
Facebook offers advertisers the option to 
commercially exploit potentially sensi-
tive information to perform tailored ad 
campaigns. This practice lays, in the best 
case, within a gray legal area according to 
the recently enforced GDPR. Our results 
reveal that 67% of FB users (22% of citi-
zens) worldwide are labeled with some 
potentially sensitive ad preference. Inter-
estingly, users in rich developed coun-
tries present a significantly higher expo-
sure to be assigned sensitive ad 
preferences. Our work also reveals that 
the enforcement of the GDPR had a neg-
ligible impact on FB regarding the use of 
sensitive ad preferences within the EU. 
We believe it is urgent that stakeholders 
within the online advertising ecosystem 
(that is, advertisers, ad networks, pub-
lishers, policymakers, and so on) define 
an unambiguous list of personal data 
items that should not be used anymore 
to protect users from potential privacy 
risks as those described in this article.
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